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THE TAKING AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
UNDER A DEFENSE AND WAR PROGRAMt
PHILIP MARCUS*
Under a defense and war program one spotlight of public attention focuses
upon property rights. Whether this focal point exists on the same plane of
importance as those of life, liberty and labor may be a matter of dispute, but
certainly the modern Atlas of a war-burdened earth is a xnan of property.
In this article it is proposed to explore the effects of the needs of a defense
and war program upon property rights. The problems treated are primarily
concerned with the direct taking and destruction of property rather than the
effect of regulatory measures upon property rights. The rights touched upon
are those of ownership, of possession, and of control over the use of property.
To what extent are losses of property rights compensable?
After some introductory material this article will be developed under seven
major headings: (1) History of expropriation of property for war purposes;
(2) The right to take, use or destroy property; (3) The methods by which
property is taken; (4) The kinds of property and purposes for which it may
be taken; (5) Expropriation under foreign law; (6) The right to and the
measure of compensation; and (7) Damage from hostile action.
Regulation versus Expropriation
Primarily, property rights under a war economy are affected by govern-
ment action in two ways. Regulatory control and the direct acquisition of
property have become standard practice. The first normally' but not neces-
sarily2 is negative i'n operation. Property still remains in private ownership
but limits are prescribed as to what the owner may do with such property and
what he may not do. But in ways not inconsistent with these restrictions he
still may treat the property pretty much as his own.- On the other hand,
expropriation is a taking of the property from the owner by the government.
This does not necessarily mean that the former owners always disappear from
the picture save for their rights of compensation.4 In Great Britain during
tThis is the first of two installments under this heading. The second half of Mr.
Marcus' article will appear in the June issue of the Cornell Law Quarterly. [Ed.]
*The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of any govern-
ment agency.
1E.g., Necessity of getting a license or permit to dispose of or acquire property (tires,
autos).2A priority order has both positive and negative implications.
3Cf. Note, American Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 427, 453, n. 162.4Normally, however, they do disappear.
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the present war, the government has requisitioned many merchant vessels
while permitting them to be managed and operated by the former owners
under government instructions.5 This was true in the United States during
the last world war and is being repeated in the present conflagration. 6
In time of war or in a time of earnest preparation for defense, both regula-
tory control and expropriation of property are necessary.6"' The two not infre-
quently are complementary 7 ; thus during the first world war the United
States requisitioned a large number of hulls which were in the process of con-
struction as ships. By the use of priority orders the government was able to
have the vessels built whereas their completion would have been impossible
by private owners.8 The presence or threat of the requisitioning power often
ensures obedience to regulatory control."'
Differences do exist, however. Regulation is more flexible than expropria-
tion; by leaving ownership intact along with a residue of control it avoids the
specter of large-scale government ownership, and, on the surface at least, is
less disturbing than a direct'taking of property.9 It enables an owner to co-
operate with the government in the use of his property; not infrequently he
may have a chance effectively to present his views to the decision-making
officials as to the type or extent of the regulations. Obedience may be com-
pelled in many ways: penal sanctions, economic sanctions, publicity.
5See THE ECONOmIST, Jan. 13, 1940, p. 52; World Economic Survey 1939-1941, Eco-
nomic Intelligence Service, League of Nations (1941) 247; Note, Role of British Mer-
chant Marine in War (March 4, 1942) Bulletins from Britain, p. 7.62d Annual Report, U. S. Shipping Board (1918) 34. Owners of vessels requisitioned
in this war will become agents of the War Shipping Administration. See INFORMATION
DIGEsT, April 20, 1942.6
'See the Price Administrator's remarks, Hearings before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, Pt. 1, 774. Mr. Patterson remarked
that there was no doubt that priority control, requisitioning, and price control were three
closely related elements. Id. Pt. 2, 1541.7The Australian National Security (Prices) Regulations confer broad requisitioning
powers, not contingent upon disobedience to a price regulation, upon the Minister of
State for Trade and Customs (after receipt of a report from the Commonwealth Prices
Commissioner). S. R. No. 176, 1940. No similar provision is found in the Price Con-
trol Act recently passed in this country. Commandeering powers obliquely conferred
upon the Price Administrator by executive order No. 8734, 6 Fed. Reg. 1917, are quite
limited in scope and availability. See also Claim of Hirst & Co., 4th Report of the De-
fense of the Realm Losses Royal Commission (London 1919) for the interplay among
requisition orders for existing and future wool tops, priority orders, and price schedules.
See infra note 8a.
SSee Smith v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 182 (1929). Cf. 2d Annual Report of U. S.
Shipping Board (1918) 33; (ships as a means of preserving commercial organizations
and alleviating hardships).8
"This power of Congress to commandeer the Nation's resources was the true basis
of our control of industry during the last war, supplemented by priorities, price control,
conservation, simplification, substitution, and conversion of facilities." Testimony of
Mr. Baruch, Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2 (1941) 992.
9It is customary to regard expropriation as a last resort. See Hearings, loc. cit., infra
note 15.
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On the other hand there are numerous situations where expropriation is
the better answer. Complete domination often i's necessary, for example,
where lands are taken for a military camp, or where chattels or commodities
are taken over for central distribution." This is also true where articles in
course of construction can only thus be expeditiously completed. 1 The burden
of war time expenses and war time regulations may be so great that the prop-
erty owners themselves may request the government to take their property.'2
The government may step in to prevent a going concern from ceasing work be-
cause of insolvency,13 or because of labor troubles.' 4 Difficulty in enforcing
numerous regulations may require the government to take over a particular
piece of property or the total output of some commodity or article.' 5 Regula-
tory control on a large scale suffers from a time lag between conception and
execution, 16 which, on occasion, may make a direct taking and domination
preferable. Normally, moreover, a taking of .property is followed by pay-
ment therefor within a reasonable time.
Voluntary versus Compulsory Acquisition
The compulsory taking of property by the government is wont to be thought
of as a castor oil method of acquisition. It goes without saying that voluntary
transfer is generally less conducive to headaches and heartaches than compul-
sory acquisition. But in an emergency period expropriation is a common
phenomenon. To the question, why direct purchase is not the most feasible
method of acquisition if it is assumed that the property must be paid for, there
are many valid answers. Leaving aside donations, a voluntary transfer of
property calls for a willing buyer and a willing seller. There are always per-
sons who will not sell their property. Of those willing to sell, some will
honestly believe that their property is worth considerably more than the gov-
'OCompare order of War Production Board for all silk processors to sell all their silk
supplies to the Defense Supplies Corporation, VicToRy, Feb. 17, 1942, p. 4; A WEEK OF
THE WAR, Feb 20, 1942: (raw sugar). See Hearings before House Committee on Banking
and Currency on H. R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1941) p. 774.
11See 2d Annual Report of U. S. Shipping Board (1918) 33; Foreign Relations
(1917) Supp. 2, Vol. 1, p. 616: ships.
12 See THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1941, at p. 459.
13This appears to have been the occasion for the requisitioning of the Federal Enamel-
ing and Stamping Company plant during the last world war. See Note, American Eco-
nomic MobilLzation (1942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 427, 519. Recently, machinery equipment
and supplies of a t.n.t. plant were seized for this purpose. See INFORuiATIOx DIGEST,
Jan. 31, 1942.
14See Note, American Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 427, 519 et seq.
15Cf. Mr. Henderson's remarks, Hearings before House Committee on Banking and
Currency on H. R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941) 58; A Week of the War, March
14, 1942, p. 6.
16Cf. Note, American Economic Mobilization (1942) 52 HARv. L. REv. 427, 447, n.
135, 448-449.
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ernment's estimate; others will attempt to take advantage of the government's
needs to use hold-up tactics.17
But the unwilling seller is by no means the major factor in the use of com-
pulsory methods. Wars have little use for loiterers. Speed is essential. And
speed is generally not an element in the process of negotiating a voluntary
purchase. When two traders meet it is rarely a case of love at first sight.
Acquisition cannot wait the completion of a dicker. In a very great number
of instances the government, after taking property by compulsory means, has
found it possible, with little friction, to come to an agreement with the owner
as to the price to be paid.' 8 Again, the title of the purported owner may be
so clouded that it would be improvident for the government to pay him even
a mutually agreeable price. Many a condemnation suit is brought merely to
give the United States a clear title-the title it takes by compulsory means is
a fresh title, free from infirmities ° -- and to enable the person entitled to
compensation to receive payment as promptly as possible.20 A similar neces-
sity for getting a fresh title may exist where the total amount of encumbrances
against the property exceeds the value of the property.
A further reason for administrative officials resorting to compulsory
methods is to avoid charges of fraud and negligence which may arise from
direct purchases, especially in connection with land, where competitive bidding
and cost plus fixed fee contracts are out of the question.21 The War Depart-
17Gt. Brt. Defence of the Realm Losses Royal Commission, First Report of the
Commissioners, 1915-16, pp. 4, 5. "Comparison of the scale of payments in the Autumn
and Winter 1914-15 as the result of bargains for indispensable accommodation in a time
of public emergency, and of payments made more recently on the footing of compensation
for loss suffered will, we think, show that in the time of a great war the difference of
cost involved in the two systems may be a matter of very grave public concern." See
also, SALTER, ALLIED SHIPPING CONTROL (1921) 39.
18Cf. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
on H. R. 4965, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941) 48.
19Cf. Declaration of Taking Act, 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U. S. C. § 258 a (1941).
This is because the government in the exercise of its power to take property may deter-
mine the extent of the interest to be taken. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282,
298, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1893) ; Warm Springs Irrigation District v. Pacific Livestock Co.,
270 Fed. 560 (C. C. A. 9th 1921) ; Oakland Club v. South Carolina Public Service
Authority, 30 F. Supp. 334 (E. D. S. C. 1939), affirmed, 110 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 4th
1940). In Massachusetts, where the United States has condemned lands held under a
registered title, for practical reasons, the government has desired to have issued to it a
title certificate. Under Section 46 of c. 185 of the Laws of Massachusetts, the certificate
to be issued by the registrar contains certain qualifications and exceptions which give the
person to whom it is issued quite clearly a marketable title but not one absolutely free
from encumbrances. Nevertheless in cases where the government has taken the property
by condemnation, the registrar has issued certificates without any such qualifications or
exceptions.2
°Quite often no other person than the purported owner appears as a claimant, and he
is paid the agreed price.2 1Ultimately where compulsion is used, an impartial tribunal may be availed of to
determine the compensation to be paid. See infra Part VI.
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ment during the defense program found itself much embarrassed by its use of
brokers acting on a commission basis.22
While the government will resort to direct purchase where possible, its use
of compulsory powers is inevitable and necessary. 23
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR
WAR PURPOSES
A. Before the 19th Century
In England, at an early date, saltpeter not infrequently was made subject
to the crown's demands, while ships were often requisitioned in the middle
ages for war purposes.2 Even as today, much of the coastal lands of Eng-
land were fortified or occupied by the armed forces to repel invasion, early
threatened by the Spanish Armada, and later by the building fleets of
Napoleon.
Wartime expropriation of property in the United States has had a long
history. The Revolutionary War occasioned considerable taking of property,
and requisitioning to provide for the needs of the soldiers was extensive.2 5 But
this period was notable especially for its being one of the first instances of
large-scale taking of enemy property. Colony after colony found the Tories
in their midst inviting objects of expropriation acts, 26 for, in the main, the
Tories were men of property. Realty as well as personalty was confiscated on
a large scale. As the war continued the emphasis shifted from a taking of
the former to a taking of the latter.27
22See Hearings before a Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense
Program, 77th CONG., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1941) 54 et seq. The use of brokers for this
purpose may, under some circumstances, be of genuine benefit to the government, especi-
ally when there is lack of trained government personnel. See Hearings before Subcominit-
tee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 4965, 77th CONG. 1st Sess.
(1941) 46-47.2 3Administrative officials are sometimes either unaware of such considerations or think
it politically inadvisable to support compulsory acquisition. Compare the statement by
the Under Secretary of War that "The policy is to resort to condemnation only when
land cannot be obtained by voluntary sale at a reasonable price," with that of General
Somerville to the effect that recourse to condemnation proceedings was being employed
as a fixed principle. Hearings, loc. cit. supra note 18, at 54. Hearings before the Sub-
committee of the Senate on Appropriations on H. R. 4965, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 48.2 4 ScoTT v. HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF REQUISITION (1920) 59, 148 et seq.2 5 CLARK, EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR To DECEMBER 1917 (1918) 44 et seq.,
201 et seq.26 Thompson, Anti-Loyalists Legislation during the American Revolution (1908) 3 ILL.
L. REV. 81; Turlington, Treatment of Enemy Property in the United States (1928) 22
Ams. 3. INT. L. 270. Many of these statutes are set out in 1 A-I. STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN
RELATIONS 201 et seq.27See Thompson, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 154-159.
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B. Early 19th Century in the United States
Between this war and the Civil War, property rights were affected on a
comparatively minor scale by the recurring instances of conflicts in which
the United States engaged. The French spoliation claims, famed for their
long-drawn-out judicial history,28 arose out of the troublesome Napoleonic
times. But in the War of 1812, British subjects within the United States
had the benefit of a grace period given by Congress for the removal of their
property.29
During the Mexican War considerable territory came under military oc-
cupation and requisitioning seems to have been resorted to freely.30
C. The Civil War and the War 'with Spain
Expropriation and confiscation were prevalent during the Civil War. Con-
gress passed several confiscation acts. The first made the use to which the
property was put the test of confiscability ;S1 but in the following year a more
drastic act made rebel ownership enough to justify confiscation.3 2 This latter
act made sales of property by one residing in a loyal state but aiding the rebel-
lion subject to invalidation.P Both personalty and realty came within its
terms,3 4 but seizure of the thing condemned was essential to a forfeiture pro-
ceeding.P In the case of realty, doubts as to the constitutionality of absolute
forfeiture 6 led Congress to limit the forfeiture provisions to the life of the
offender.a7 These Confiscation Acts were shortly supplemented by the Aban-
doned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863, 3 and its amendment of
July 2,' 1864.39
"The Confiscation Act authorized proceeding only against the interest
of the disloyal owner; the Captured and Abandoned Property Act di-
28Discussed in Briggs, Fanny and Hope v. United States, 46 Ct. Cls. 214 (1911).
292 STAT. 780 (1812).
30See Lawrence, War Claims and Claims of Aliens, H. R. 262, 43 Cong., 1st
Sess., (1874) Ser. No. 1623, p. 16, note 41. Much was unpaid. See CLARi, ESER-
GENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1917 (1918) 32.
3112 STAT. 319 (1861). The president was to cause property of pers9ns using it to aid
the insurrection to be seized and condemned.
32Act of July 17, 1862, 12 STAT. 589. Loyal or friendly lienors were protected by an
Act of March 3, 1863, 12 STAT. 762.33Such sales were upheld where the government did not invoke the statute. Conrad v.
Waples, 96 U. S. 279, 24 L. ed. 721 (1877).34United States v. Republican Banner Officers, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,148 (C. C. Tenn.
1863).8 5Pelham v. Rose, 9 Wall. 103, 19 L. ed. 602 (1869).
36U. S. CONsT. Art. I. § 9, cl. 3.
87Act of July 17, 1862, 12 STAT. 627. For an extended discussion of these acts, see
27 R. C. L, 940 et seq.3812 STAT. 820.
3913 STAT. 375.
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rected the seizure of the property itself; and its sale carried the title
against all claimants. The former, as respects property, had all the merci-
less features, inseparable from a war measure, and treated as enemies,
whose property could be confiscated, all residents, within the insurgent
States; the latter had this beneficent provision, that it made a discrimina-
tion among those whom the rules of international law classes as enemies,
in favor of those who, though resident within the hostile territory, main-
tained in fact a loyal adhesion to the Governmnent." 40
Requisitioning by military commanders was common,41 and on January
31, 1862, the president was authorized to take over the railroads and place
them under military control 42
Initially, the Confederate States adopted a policy of sequestrating property
of northern sympathizers as alien enemy property upon a theory of reprisal
for the confiscatory activities of the Union. By an enactment of August 30,
1861, 4 3 sequestration of such property was made a source of indemnification
to Southern sympathizers for the expropriation of their property under some
act of the Union. This statute exempted debts of the Confederate government
and those of any of its constituent states as well as the property of citizens of
certain states, including those of the District of Columbia.44 The Confederate
provisions were considerably more elaborate and on the whole had fewer ear-
marks of passion than those of the Union enactments. A subsequent amend-
ment of February 15, 1862,4 was considerably more drastic and confiscatory.
During the Spanish-American War, the United States considered itself
bound by treaties with Spain to allow its merchants a year to leave with their
goods ;46 but private property on the seas was not infrequently captured by
this country.47
40United States v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372, 375, 25 L. ed. 479 (1878).41See Lawrence, War Claims and Claims of Alien,, H. REPORT No. 262, 43d Cong.,
1st Sess., (1874) Ser. No. 1623, p. 16. This report is a storehouse of factual information
and legal theory on the taking and destruction of property in war time.42See H. R. EXEc. Doc., Vol. 4, pt. 1, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., (1865-1866) Ser.
No. 1251. As to requisitions of materials for use in connection with railroads during
this period, see Aitchison, War Tine Control of American Railways (1940) 26 VA. L.
REV. 847, 856 et seq.43 CONFEDERATE STATUTES AT LARGE, Ch. LXI.
44But this exemption did not apply to those actually aiding the Union. It may be
surmised that this exception to an exception was one not readily possible to put into
practice.
45CNFEDEFATE STATUTES AT LARGE, Ch. LXXI.46See Turlington, Treatment of Enemy Property in the United States (1928) 22 Am.
J. INT. L. 270. Spain allowed United States ships anchored in Spanish ports 5 days to
leave after publication of a royal decree. FORIGN RELATIONS (1898) 774.
47E.g., The Pedro, 175 U. S. 354, 20 Sup. Ct. 138 (1899). See Finkelnburg, Private
Property on the High Seas (1904) 38 Amr. L. REv. 641, 645.
1942]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
D. The World War of 1914-1918
The World War of 1914-1918 was a raven-hued harbinger of what might
happen to property rights in a war to come. The declaration of war was
followed by the requisitioning of numerous German vessels lying within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.48  Other nations followed suit.
The seizure of neutral Dutch ships in our ports seriously strained our relations
with the Netherlands. 49 At the outbreak of the war 91 vessels of German
registry interned in American ports were first taken into protective custody
and then, under a Joint Resolution of May 12, 1917, and a supplementary
executive order of June 30, 1917, were taken over by the United States Ship-
ping Board. 50
In the United States, the Emergency Fleet Corporation on August 3, 1917,
requisitioned all ships of over 2,500 tons dead weight capacity under construc-
tion; 431 ships were thus acquired. 51 Title to vessels being built for foreign
accounts -was taken by the United States in order to ban operations under
the American flag even when in allied service; former owners of vessels being
built for American accounts were given opportunity to resume title on comple-
tion of vessels provided they would surrender possession of the vessels to the
Board for the\duration of the war plus six months, at requisition rates fixed
by the Board, provided they would reimburse the Board for all expenditures
incurred in completing the vessels, including the cost of speeding construction,
and provided they would waive all claims arising from requisitioning.9 2
The Federal Trade Commission in the United States early recommended
that the production and distribution of coal be conducted through a pool in
the hands of a government agency. 8 Railroads were actually taken over by
the government. 4 The Army and the Navy issued over 7,000 compulsory
orders. 55 The War Department found it necessary to resort to requisitioning
48See 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) 523.49 See FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) Supp. 1. Great Britain did
likewise. Ibid. 87 vessels were taken over by Navy Department in ports which included
the Philippines and Puerto Rico. See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT U. S. SHIPPING BOARD
(1918) 47.
50 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT U. S. SHIPPING BOARD (1918) 19. 99 ex-German vessels
were taken over during this war. Id. at 22.
51id. at 33. Many more U. S. vessels were requisitioned before the end of the war.
Id. at 23 et seq. It has been said that all American steamers available for the nation's
use were requisitioned. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT U. S. SHIPPING BOARD (1919) 14.
52 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT U. S. SHIPPING BOARD (1918) 11. Cf. British practice,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1917) Supp. 2, vol. 1, pp. 605-607, 616.
53Letter from Federal Trade Commission, SEN. Doc., vol. 3, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1917).
54See Aitchison, War Time Control of American Railways (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 847;
Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917, p. 380-the American Express
Company and certain coastwise steamship lines were also taken over.
5-Schwartz, Commandeering of Plants during World War I, June 19, 1941, Hd. 3621
U.S.
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of supplies and equipment to a considerable extent in late 1917 and the first
part of 1918.53 The War Department alone acquired 571,286 acres of land
during the World War,5 7 and realty was acquired in less sizeable amounts by
other government agencies. Six plants were taken over by the government
during the last war under its requisitioning power.5s  In a few instances the
physical property rather than an operating plant was requisitioned. The
Cape Cod Canal came under the control of the government ;59 radio stations 6
and telegraph and telephone systems.61
In the United Kingdom, large quantities of land and numerous buildings
were expropriated for military and naval use. The government took control
of the coal mines, as did the Russian Provisional Government, while in France
the government became the sole vendor.6 2 In Canada the food controller
was empowered, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to requisition
food.6 3
Within the belligerent countries, enemy alien property was sequestrated on
a large scale.64 Laws of this sort in a number of Latin-American countries
owed their existence largely to the insistence of the United States.65 The
Alien Property Custodian in the United States took over $500,000,000 of
property, 6 which included some property taken by mistake from citizens of
allies or of the United States.6 7 The possibility of disproportinate retaliation
by Turkey gave Turkish interests in this country an immunity not enjoyed
by other enemy nationals.
6 8
E. The Present Struggle
The present struggle has already brought in its wake an expropriation of
property awesome in its scope. In the United States the railroads have not
been taken over as was done during the last World War, but otherwise a
5OReport of Commandeering Section, quoted in Schwartz, supra note 55.5 7 See REP. SEC. WAR (1941) 38.5SSee Hearings before the Senate Committee investigating the Munitonms Industry,
73rd Cong. (1934) part XVII, pp. 4270-4273.59See U. S. v. Boston, C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877 (C. C. A. 1st 1921).
6OEx. ORDER No. 2585.
GIPROCL. No. 1466.62Letter from Federal Trade Commission, SEN. Doc., vol. 3, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 49 (1917).6 3
KEITH, WAR GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINIONS (1921) 53.64See FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) Supp. 2, p. 259 et seq.
oS5ee id. at 365 et seq; FOREIGN RELATIONS (1919) vol. 2, p. 287 et seq., 400 et seq.;
FOREIGN RELATIO NS (1920) vol. 2, p. 755 et seq., 878-879. As to Haiti, see FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1921) vol. 2, p. 233 et seq. In some instances American advisers helped
draft their acts and American citizens were appointed alien enemy property custodians.
As to Cuba, see FOREIGN RELATIONS (1918) Supp. 2, p. 384 et seq.
6 6See S. REPORT No. 273, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) Ser. No. 8829.
GTSee FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) Supp. 2, p. 4.
68 1d. at 272.
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comparison between the two periods on this score is dearly one of lesser to
greater.
From the fall of 1939, the uneasy neutrality of the United States haltingly
but persistently prepared itself for ultimate defense and war by a series of
measures demanding greater and greater takings of personal and real prop-
erty. In the World War, army camps were transitional points from which a
constant stream of expeditionary forces were sent abroad. Camps were in
the main temporary and comparatively few. American industry during that
war never developed into an important source of the weapons of warfare. The
army camps of today are more numerous than those of the last war, and need
to be of considerably larger size to provide for more trainees and to permit
large areas for training in the maneuvers required by modem mechanized
warfare.69  A bombing range is not a five-acre project. Plant expansion
necessitated by the position of the United States as an arsenal, first for the
allied powers and now for herself as well, has been another important factor
in the large-scale acquisition of property.7 0 A third important factor is de-
fense housing. For a single project the War Department has taken over a
greater acreage than it took during the World War. During the fiscal year
of 1941 the Department acquired 7,647,551 acres.71 Since the close of that
fiscal year through January, 1942, over 2,000,000 more acres of land have
come under the complete control of the War Department, part of it through
options, and part through condemnation.72  Substantial amounts of realty have
been acquired by other agencies, such as the Navy Department, Maritime
Commission, Federal Com munications Commission, the R. F. C., and the vari-
ous federal agencies connected with defense housing. During the fiscal year
1941 nearly a million and a half acres were acquired for defense purposes by
condemnation. 73
Under the Export Control Requisition Act of October 10, 1940,74 and the
69See Statement of Secretary of War Stimson comparing today's camps with those
of 1917-1918. Hearings Before Special Senate Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1941). As to the need for access roads,
see the same statement, and War Dep't Press Release of May 6, 1941.70From June, 1940, through the passage of the Fifth Supplemental Appropriation Act
of 1941, $1,785,000,000 was appropriated for plant expansion. Statement of Under Sec-
retary of War. Hearings, supra note 69, at 23-24.71See Annual Report Secretary of War (1941) p. 38. 140,188 acres were acquired in
the fiscal year of 1940. Ibid.72Information supplied by War Department. Over 12,000,000 acres of land have come
under the control of the War Department for war purposes. See, Hearings before
Sentate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 2212, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 18.
As to public lands included in this figure, see infra, Part IV.73See Annual Report Att'y Gen. (1941) p. 147.
4454 STAT. 1090 (1940), 50 U. C. S. § 711 (Supp. 1941).
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Requisitioning Act of October 16, 1941, 75 personal property of various kinds76
has been requisitioned, and in some instances excessive inventories held by
private persons have been seized. 77
By early 1941 some 87 foreign ships lying idle in United States waters had
been seized. 78 These seizures inspired other American countries to take simi-
lar steps, and most of 148 ships laid up there were taken over.79 During the
fiscal year of 1941, 237 vessels were taken over by the United States for con-
version to naval auxiliaries, district and patrol craft.80
Thus far at least four plants in operation have been taken over by the gov-"
ernment,8 ' as well as an inactive plant owned by the Federal Alloy Steel Cor-
poration8 2 and possession has been taken of the Toledo, Peoria, and Western
Railroad Company.8 3 In February, 1942, the Navy Department announced
that proceedings had been instituted for the acquisition of the Groton Iron
Work at Groton, Connecticut.s4
The freezing of foreign funds has resulted in the taking over of more than
75Pub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. (1941).7 G6Raw materials, railroad tracks, etc. Information Digest, Dec. 26, 1941; Information
Digest, Jan. 31, 1942, p. 5; see infra n. 87. •7 7 See Note, American Eco~wmic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARv. L. Rzv. 427, 455, note
172. Cf. Information Digest, Feb. 24, 1942: Aluminum.7 8 These were mainly Danish and Italian vessels, but included also French, Belgium,
Gernian, Greek, Norwegian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Roumanian and Yugoslavian vessels.
See WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1939-1941, ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (League of
of Nations 1941) 254-255. The French liner Normandie was taken over on December
20, 1941. DE-T. OF STATE BuLL. 544. Prior to disastrous fire which laid the boat, re-
named the Lafayette, on its side at its Hudson River Pier, it was planned to resell this
vessel to its former owners or their successors after the emergency when the vessel should
no longer be needed by the United States. See Exec. Order No. 9001"-A, Dec. 27, 1941,
7 Fed. Reg. 801.7 9WORLD EcONOMIc SURVEY, supra note 78, at 256. For somewhat different figures
see, DEWILDE, Wartime Economics Cooperation in the Americas (1942) 17 For. Pol.
Rep. 286, 295.
S0 See Annual Report Secretary of the Navy (1941) p. 2.8 1 See Notes, Executiie Commandeering of Strike-Bound Plants (1941) 51 YALE L J.
282; American Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HAv. L. REv. 427, 506. One of such
plants seems to have been rescued from insolvency by this action on the part of the
government. See Information Digest, Nov. 26, 1941, p. 2: War Department arranged
$500,000 financial assistance. The Triton Chemical Co. Plant in Virginia, not referred
to in the above notes, tias been taken over. The Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Company plant in Kearny, New Jersey, was taken over August 23, 1942, and given back
to its owners January 6, 1942. Writers have treated the North American Aviation
Company case as an instance of protective custody rather than a taking-over. See Notes,
Executive Commandeering of Strike-Bound Plants (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 282; American
Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 427, 506. But the War Department
seems to regard this as a temporary taking, see Hearings before Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee for the Judiciary of S. 2054, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 7.
s
2 See Information Digest, Oct. 27, 1941, p. 2. This was taken by condemnation.
83Ex. Order No. 9108, 7 Fed. Reg. 2201; Order No. 1 of Office of Defense Trans-
portation.84 1nformation Digest, February 2, 1942.
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$200,000,000 of materials.8 5 At least one shipyard has been taken over by the
Maritime Commission.8 6 The War Production Board has been instrumental in
having a good deal of war materials seized,8 7 and many alien enemy business
houses in the United States have been padlocked.8 8
In Great Britain substantial amounts of real and personal property have
been acquired by the government for war purposes.8 9 It has been said that
industries producing war supplies conducted by private manufacturers or
contractors are all under government control.9 0 Railways operate under
government control. 91 Most of Great Britain's merchant marine is operating
under requisition by the government. 92 Neutral vessels and cargoes have been
requisitioned, 93 and German exports were seized after the war broke out.94
In the United Kingdom and in a number of its dominions and colonies, dollar
holdings and United States securities have been requisitioned. 95
In Germany numerous plants have been designated "war plants" and placed
under military control.96 At the outbreak of war the German government
took over oil and building iron stocks. 97
In South Africa a shortage of rifles caused the Government to commandeer
them, not without opposition based upon real or supposititious fear of the
natives. 98
8 5 Information Digest, Jan. 5, 1942, pp. 6-7.8 6 Property of the Savannah Shipyards, Inc. Information Digest, Jan. 6, 1942, p. 3.8 TSee Information Digest, Jan. 31, 1942, p. 5. A Week of the War, March 14, 1942.
By April, 1942, some 60 separate requisitioning actions had been used to seize a wide
variety of property. See W.P.B. press release No. 784, April 6, 1942. Thus far no
legal action has arisen from these requisitions, but some litigation is expected.8 8See Information Digest, Jan. 23, 1942.891n connection with requisitioning land and buildings, it has been said that as of July
4, 1941, 124,411 requisitions had been made for the Army; as of July 5, 1941, 28,000
requisitions for the Royal Air Force; as of the end of July, for the Royal Navy about
10,000 requisitions. A good deal of requisitioning has been had in connection with re-
housing homeless, and with caring for civil evacuees. See Report of John W. Morris on
the Requisitioning of Land and Buildings and the Operation of the Compensation (De-
fense Act 1939) 1941, Cmd. p. 4. As to requisitioning railway wagons, see S. R. & 0.
1941, No. 1570.90 See (January 21, 1942) Bulletins from Britain, p. 4.
91 1d. at 592See (1940) 21 JOURNAL OF BRIT. PARL. OF THE EMPIRE 246; THE EcoNo iST, April
27, 1940, at p. 766; id., May 25 and June 1, 1940, at pp. 937, 978; id. October 11, 1940,
at p. 459.
93See letter to THE EcoNOMIsr, Sept. 14, 1940.
94(1940) 21 JOURNAL OF THE BRIT. PARL. OF THE EmIIRn 4, 22, 37.9 5 E.g., S. R. & 0. (1941) No. 20. Cf. New Zealand: Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 6159, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)
723. As to Indian dollar holdings, see S. R. & 0. (1941) No. 142, and THE ECONOMIST,
October 4, 1941, p. 417. As to sterling securities, see S. R. & 0. (1941) No. 1570. See,
in general, Mann, Exchange Restrictions in England (1940) 3 MOD. L. Rv. 202, 204 et
seq.
96See WORLD EcoNomIc SuavY, 1939-1941, EcoNomic INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (League
of Nations 1941) 40.
97THE EcoNomisT, October 26, 1941, p. 521.9 S5ee (1940) 121 ROUND TABLE 158 et seq.
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In the Netherlands Indies, German ships and other enemy property were
promptly seized upon German invasion of Holland.99 By a decree of March 5,
1942, the Netherlands East Indies government requisitioned Netherlands East
Indies merchant ships.99' Guatemala and Honduras have blocked the funds
of Axis nationals,100 while Brazil has closed Axis news agencies. 1 1 In Cuba,
control of transportation and communication facilities was established as of
January 1, 1942.10 "
In lands conquered by the Axis powers, the taking of property on a large
scale by the conquerors has become commonplace. 1 2
II. THE RIGHT TO TAKE PROPERTY FOR DEFENSE AND WAR PURPOSES
Under this and other legal systems there is no absolute right of private
ownership, of possession, or of control of property as against the government
in either peace time or war time.103 The power to take property for the pub-
lic use is known as eminent domain. There is no express authorization in
the United States Constititution for the exercise of eminent domain. But
this power needs no such sanction since it stems from the very essence of
sovereignty and government-a nation's power to maintain its existence and
to carry on its governmental functions. 0 4
The war power is embodied in the Constitution.0 5 But on a parity of
reasoning, the power would exist without constitutional sanction. In respect
to property rights, attempts have been made to distinguish this power from
the power of eminent domain, the police power, and the taxing power. 0 6 As
between the first three powers mentioned, distinctions are often difficult to
9 9 (June 8, 1940) Com. Reports 528.
9OaNetherlands News, April 1, 1942, p. 49.
100(1942) 6 FOREIGN COMIMERCE WEEKLY 15. Guatemala has imposed, also, discrim-
inatory taxes on Axis nationals. Ibid.
101(1942) 6 FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY 11.1 lo(Feb. 28, 1942) FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY 15.
'o2 Cf. WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1939-1941, ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (League
of Nations 1941) 45; (1941) 3 FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY 85; Inter-Allied Review,
Nov. 15, 1941. See Washington Sunday Star, Sept. 22, 1941, p. A-6.
'
0 3 See MARIN, EXPROPRIATION FOR PUBLIC USE IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, Inter-
national Congress of Social Authorities, Expropriation of land, (Seville Oct., 1928).
Cf. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1894) c. 1.
'
0 4See Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371, 374, 23 L. ed. 449 (1874) ; City of
Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959, 963 (C. C. A. 9th 1942). Cf. Georgia v.
Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 480, 44 Sup. Ct. 369 (1924).
'
0 5 Art. I. § 8, (cls. 1-9) ; Art. IV, §4; cf. Art II, § 2, cl. 1.106See FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN (1940) sections 5-8, a study prepared in the Lands
Division of the Department of Justice. Despite its emphasis upon federal eminent do-
main it contains probably the most comprehensive treatment of the law of eminent do-
main now in print in the United States. Published in limited numbers, its distribution
has been confined almost entirely to government attorneys and government libraries. See
also RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1894) notes at 9 et seq.
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make. Broadly, the exercise of eminent domain requires compensation, the
exercise of the police power does not. The first generally envisages a use
by the taker, whereas the second usually entails destruction without actual
use-the thing by its existence is detrimental to the public. But these gen-
eralizations fall down often enough 01 7 to indicate that a balancing of equities,
of necessities, and a consideration of what the public pocketbook can and
should bear may cause one or the other label to be applied. Nevertheless the
distinction is often asserted 0 8 and different results generally follow a deter-
mination that one or the other power has been exercised.
In respect to property rights during a war period, the war power is gen-
erally treated as synonymous with the eminent domain power, although some-
times it has the earmarks of an exercise of the police power. The courts use
eminent domain principles and terminology in cases of war time taking, and in
this article they generally are treated as synonymous. The right to take prop-
erty in England in war time has been linked with the king's right of purvey-
ance in the middle ages,10 9 and so has the right of eminent domain."10 Never-
theless, it is believed that the two lack perfect identification. The precedents of
eminent domain in peace time relate almost entirely to real property. There
is no backlog of precedent for the taking of personal property in the law of
eminent domain. War time expropriation, on the other hand, has been ap-
plied on a substantial scale to both personalty and realty. Eminent domain
is unfamiliar with the concept of "enemy property."
While the right of a government to possess or take property for war pur-
poses has been universally acknowledged, there has been little law on the right
of individuals to go upon or take property for similar purposes. If the danger
is acute and such measures are necessary, it would seem that members of the
public could take necessary steps no matter how harmful to private property
without liability therefor, subject, however, to whether their action was
reasonable under the circumstances."' The English common law has recog-
nized just such a right in members of the public to enter upon and use the
property of others to repel an invasion.1 1 2
107See infra, Part VI.
08It has been said the distinction is hard to make but is recognized in international
law. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property (1941) 35 Am. J. INT. L. 243, 251, 254.
109ScoTT V. HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF REQUISITION (1920) 50 et seq., 138 et seq.
110 Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792, 793 (1887).
11"One test of reasonableness would be the possibility of prompt action by the govern-
iment itself. Cf. 40 STAT. 895 (1918) (condemnation authorized by any person to
furnish electric power). Compare the right of an officer to go on property in the line
of his duty. Heinz v. Murphy, 24 A. (2d) 917 (Md. 1942).
112"And in such case on such extremity they may dig for gravel, for the making of
bulwarks, for this for the public, and every one hath benefit by it; but after the danger
is over, the trenches and bulwarks ought to be removed so that the owner shall not have
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A. The Right to Take Property under International Law
International law permits many instances of forcible taking of property in
war time. Capture of property in the heat of battle or at sea is standard
practice. And this is true of requisitioning by an invading army." 3  Assess-
ment upon conquered territories has been sanctioned under the name of
contribution.114
Retorsion" 5 and reprisal" 6 are doctrines under which property can be ex-
propriated and destroyed." 7 The destruction of private property in the pres-
ent war by bombing raids may bring these two doctrines into greater favor
than they have been.
Internatfonal law recognizes the right of angary-the right to take neutral
prejudice in his inheritance; and for the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage....
the suburbs of a city in time of war for the common safety shall be plucked down; and
a thing for the commonwealth every man may do without being liable to an action." The
King's prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Co. 12, 77 Eng. Repr. 1294 (1600). See also
argument of the Attorney General in Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 267, 122 Eng.
Repr. 1191, 1195 (1865).
11 3See CLARK, E ERGENcY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1917 (1918) 35.
Cf. 23 Op. A. G. 222, 226-227 (1900). In General Order No. 101, July 18, 1898, sent out
by order of the Secretary of War pursuant to a proclamation of President McKinley,
the following statement appears:
"It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government
of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property
of such government, may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his
own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same
time enjoying the revenues thereof; but he is not to destroy it save in the case of
military necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines,
cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use,
but, unless in case of military necessity, they are not to be destroyed. All churches
and buildings devoted to religious worships and to the arts and sciences, all school-
houses, are so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional de-
facement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or of works of science
or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.
"Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be re-
spected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as
telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private
individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupants, but, unless destroyed
under military necessity, are not to be retained." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1898) 783.
'
1 4See Gregory, Contributions and Requisitions in War (1915) 15 COL. L. REv. 207.
Compare the views of President Polk, 4 RicHARDsON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENT (1897) 571 with those of the McKinley administration, General Order No,
101. As to contribution exacted by Germany, see The Washington Sunday Star, Sept.
22, 1941, p. A-6.
115A term generally applied to retaliation in kind. See INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUA-
TIONS, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1932) 102.
116 See War Department Basic Field Manual Rules of Land Warfare (1940) Art.
358. Friedmann, International Law and The Present War (1940) 3 MoD. L. REv. 177,
185 et seq.
117Cf. INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1933) 39; id. (1930)
59 et seq., 1 Op. A. G. 30 (1793).
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property." 8 Sea powers such as the United States and Great Britain have
resorted to this right extensively during the last war and the present one.119
The extent of this right has been disputedP2 and its exercise in respect to
Dutch vessels during the last war brought severe diplomatic repercussions;
but in the two nations mentioned the power has been broadly asserted,' 2 ' and
exercised by the United States while still a neutral. 22
B. The Right to Take Property under Domestic Law
The law of eminent domain appears to regard the legislature as the source
of that power.1 23  Whether this is true of the taking of property for wax
purposes will be referred to subsequently. In general, however, it may be
said that the courts and administrative officials are inclined to look for statu-
tory authority to test the right to take property for such purposes. Four main
statutes exist under which property may be taken for war and defense
purposes:
1. The Act of Auiqust 1, 1888.124 This Act is not self-executing, but
authorizes condemnation of realty at the instance of an officer authorized to
procure real estate. If another act authorizes an officer to acquire ' or pur-
chase' 26 realty, he may acquire it by condemnation.' 2 6, In view of the presence
1 18 1NTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1926) 65. See Harley,
Te Law of Angary (1917) 13 Am. J. INT. L. 267; Allin, Right of Angary (1918) 2
MINN. L. REV. 415.
119 Cf. James, Modern Developments of the Law of Prize (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 505. It has been asserted that requisitioning of neutral property on land and water
was not common until the World War [INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS, NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE (1926) 65 et seq.], but earlier instances are enumerated in a British memoran-
dum of April 25, 1918 [see FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) Supp. 1].
A Hague Convention is concerned with the requisitioning of railway material coming
from neutral countries. 25 STAT. 2310, 2326.
120See views of Dutch Government, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918)
Supp. 1, vol. II, pp. 1440 et seq. Cf. statement of James W. Ryan, counsel for the Danish
Shipping Committee, Hearings before S. Committee on Commerce on S. J. Res. 67, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 51 et seq.
12 1 See FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1918) Supp. 1, vol. II, pp. 1416,
1425, 1435, 1475. As to the problems arising out of this government's promise to rede-
liver the tonnage seized, see 3D ANNUAL REPORT U. S. SHIPPING BOARD (1919) 21 et seq.
122 See supra notes 78; statement of Mr. Ryan, supra note 120. In October, 1941, the
War Department ordered seized for ultimate use by Russia bombing planes and equip-
ment purchased in Canada by Peru and awaiting shipment to Peru from Brooklyn, N. Y.
Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1941, p. 4.
'
23 See Smith v. United States, 32 Ct. Cls. 295, 309, 310 (1897). Cf. People v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. (2d) 288, 73 P. (2d) 1221 (1937).
12425 STAT. 357 (1888), 40 U. S. C. § 257 (1928).
12 5 Barnidge v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 8th 1939). Authority to
condemn under this Act recently has been conferred expressly upon the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. Pub. L. No. 506, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.1 26 Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442 (1923).
12 6 'It has been thought that the right to requisition includes the right to acquire
property by voluntary purchase, 31 Ops Att'y Gen. 344 (1918). This generally will be
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of the Act of August 1, 1888, it would seem clear that the presence of a
special appropriation act, appropriating funds to be expended in specified land
acquisition, would furnish sufficient authority to acquire realty by voluntary
conveyance or condemnatioh. 127 This is so also where an appropriation act
expressly provides for funds to be used for land acquisitions without speci-
fication.127 1 Similar authority, it would seem, may be found in an appropri-
ation act which in general terms empowers some official to use a lump sum
for war and defense purposes.' 28 An outstanding example of the latter type
of act is the Emergency Fund created for the president. 29 This would be true
even if in peace time the courts might be reluctant to find authority for the
use of eminent domain in an appropriation act providing in general terms for
the activities of some government agency. The scope of the war effort and
the rapidity with which conditions change in war time make the use of prop-
erty for future undefined purposes a necessity which a lump sum appropria-
tion may be said clearly to include unless the context indicates the contrary.
While this Act is traditionally thought of as activated by an authorizing
statute, it does not state that another statute is necessary. If the president,
therefore, under his war powers can take realty for war purposes, it is argu-
able that if he authorized an officer of the government to acquire realty, such
officer could initiate condemnation proceedings under the Act.
Under the Act of August 1, 1888, the acquiring agency' 30 requests the
Attorney General to institute condemnation proceedings. The action is
brought in the name of the United States and title vests in the United States,
a reasonable inference, but it is not necessarily so since Congress may have preferred
to leave the matter of compensation to be determined by the courts rather than by an
administrative official.127 E.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 46 Sup. Ct. 39 (1925).
127'Thus, where Congress appropriates moneys for projects which necessarily require
land for their consummation, authority to acquire land is implied. Burns v. United
States, 106 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1908). See Op. Att'y Gen., June 3, 1941.
'28Congress is not consistent in the form of its legislation. In some instances it enacts
merely an authorizing act. In other instances it authorizes the acquisition of property
and tacks on a clause that a certain sum is authorizedto be appropriated therefor, and
subsequently, in a separate act appropriates moneys. Again Congress in an act merely
appropriates moneys for specified projects which by their nature require the acquisition
of realty. Congress also has in a single act appropriated moneys in one paragraph and
expressly authorized the acquisition of property in another paragraph (e.g. Pub. L. No.
192, 77th Cong. 1st Sess.: Navy; Pub. L. No. 420, 77th Cong. 2d Sess.: Navy).
129The first act during the present crisis creating that fund was 54 STAT. 297 (1940),
41 U. S. C. § 5 (1941). That act has since been supplemented by several other acts.
One of the most recent is Pub. L. No. 353, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. Cf. Pub. L. Nos. 29,
139, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. Not infrequently the apppropriation acts for various govern-
ment agencies provide for the return by such agencies to such fund of monies allocated to
them out of it.
'SOThe Tennessee Valley Authority is one of very few exceptions. Its own attorneys
handle its condemnation suits, a practice reluctantly consented to by the Department of
Justice.
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but the control over the property is exercised by the agency making the
requests.
2. Possession pending a condeimatio.n. sidt.-In a direct expropriation
without, judicial process possession is taken as a matter of course. Where
condemnation proceedings are instituted, the government has generally relied
upon the Declaration of Taking Act1'3 or some other express statute under
which possession might be had pending the condemnation proceeding. When
no such statute is available or when it is thought undesirable to invoke the
statute, possession has been obtained on application to the court either as a
common law right incident to the exercise of eminent domain or as right to
be implied from a statutory authorization to take a fee interest.13 2 No instance
is known of resort to state statutes providing for immediate possession pend-
ing condemnation, but some dicta afford a basis of belief that the federal gov-
ernment could rely upon such statutes if it thought it necessary or advisable
to do so.'83
Immediate possession is rarely sought by the government. Sometimes up
to 60 days are allowed for occupants to remove from the premises, though
for war and defense acquisitions considerably less time is allowed. But where
large areas are taken it is customary to leave occupants of parts of the area
undisturbed until those very parts are needed for construction or other pur-
poses. Notice is usually given; nevertheless, hardship results not infre-
quently. 34  Protest in England against taking possession of land without
reasonable notice when premises were unoccupied evoked a statement from
the Secretary of State for War that service of a notice was not required but
was ususally given.' 3 5  When a recalcitrant owner refuses to remove, the
government usually procures his removal by a writ of assistance or other
judicial remedy. 136
3. The Declaration of Taking Act.3T--This Act is not an authorizing
act. 3 s During the last three years it has been used in over three-quarters of
131 See infra note 137.
132Commercial Station Post Office v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 8th
1931). See Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 Sup. Ct.
442 (1923).
133See Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92 (1928) ; Morton Butler
Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. 6th 1937). City of Oakland, 124
F. (2d) 959, 963 (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
134See infra, Part VI of this article.
13 5 See 84 SOL. J. 458.
'
36 See FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN (1940) 911. Contempt proceedings would lie for
failure to obey an order to remove.
13746 STAT. 1421, 1422 (1931), 40 U. S. C. §§ 258 a-e, (1941). A like act exists for
the District of Columbia, 45 STAT. 1417 (1929) 40 U. S. C. § 370 (1941). A few states
have similar acts.
138It may be used in a condemnation proceeding, but authority to condemn must be
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the ondemnation cases instituted by the government. It permits the filing
of a declaration of taking at the outset of a condemnation proceeding 3 9 or
after the proceeding has already begun, under which title or the interest des-
ignated vests in the United States at the time of making a deposit of the
amount of estimated just compensation.140 Upon application to the court an
order is made fixing the time when the government is to take possession.1 41
While an acquisition under a declaration of taking has been had of interests
in realty less than a fee, it generally has been used where some sort of fee
title was desired.142
Its use is regarded by administrative officials as a mixed evil. Under war
time pressure, the speed with which these declarations of taking are drafted
and the often necessarily hasty determination by officials -as to exactly what
property must be taken result from time to time in a greater amount of land
or a larger interest being taken than necessary. 43  When this occurs it may
happen that the interests of the government may be best served without ap-
preciable harm to the former owner by amending the declaration of taking to
exclude the excess. But there is serious doubt whether this may be done
without an Act of Congress.144 Moreover, contrary to the practice in a num-
ber of non-contested cases, a recent Circuit Court of Appeals case has held that
the government is not entitled to a refund where the ultimate award was less
than the deposit which had been withdrawn by the owner.145
4. The Export Control Requisitioning Act of October 10, 1940.146-This
found elsewhere. Its primary function is to enable title and possession to be acquired
at the beginning of a condemnation proceeding rather than at its termination.
139It is usually filed together with the condemnation petition.
'
40 The deposit almost invariably accompanies the filing of the declaration of taking.
The Declaration of Taking Act has been upheld as constitutional by all of a number of
courts in which its validity has been challenged. E.g. City of Oakland v. United States,
124 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 9th 1942). The Supreme Court has not had to pass upon
its validity.
141 This is usually embodied in an cx parte judgment on the declaration of taking, a
judgment procured by the government as a matter of convenience rather than necessity.
'
42 See infra, Part IV, where the question of the extent of the interest taken is dis-
cussed. The major acts under which the United States takes realty do not expressly refer
to interest in land. The effect of absence of such language will be discussed in Part IV.
'
43 The Department of Justice has proposed a statute which would minimize this pos-
sibility and alleviate most of such situations.
'4 4Cf. U. S. CoNsr. Art IV, § 4; United States v. Nicoll, 27 Fed. Cas. 149, No. 15,
879 (C. C. N. Y. 1826) ; Irving v. Marshall, 20 How. 558 (U. S. 1857). Wisconsin
Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 10 Sup. Ct. 341 (1890). See 31 Ops
Att'y Gen. 570; 34 Ops Att'y Gen. 320. But cf. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196
U. S. 119, 25 Sup. Ct. 211 (1905) ; United States v. P. & L. E. D. Co., 272 Fed. 839
(C. C. A. 6th 1921) ; 31 Ops Att'y Gen. 198, 344; 20 Ops. Att'y Gen. 93 (1891). TWo
unreported district court cases have refused to permit the acquiring agency, over the
objection of an interested party, to amend a declaration by eliminating an interest.
'
45 Miller v. United States, 125 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
14654 STAT. 1090 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 711 (Supp. 1941). Authority under this Act
was to endure until 7une 30, 1942, unless Congress otherwise provided.
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Act was passed to implement an earlier act 147 which provided for the restric-
tion of exports of military equipment and munitions as well as tools and sup-
plies necessary therefor. Under the Act of October 10, 1940, the president
can requisition military and naval equipment or munitions, as well as tools,
machinery or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing or operation
thereof. This authority is limited to articles ordered, manufactured, pro-
cured or possessed for export purposes, but a good deal of personal property
has been taken under it. The statute makes considerable personal property
available to the government by expropriation. Articles contracted for by
foreign countries and articles coming under the Lend-Lease Act are within
its terms. Furthermore, since many of the items referred to in the Act are
of a kind likely to be sent abroad either for our own forces or for allied forces,
an order by the government for such articles under a plausible claim that they
were going to be exported 148 would probably be sufficient to justify the exer-
cise of the requisitioning powers granted by the Act.
5. War Purposes Act.' 49 -This law as enacted during the last war was
meant to be a permanent act. It provides for the acquisition by the Secretary
of War, through condemnation proceedings, of realty for specified pur-
poses. 150 In the event of war or its imminence, immediate possession can
be had upon the filing of a condemnation petition. Until recently the Act
was little used, but some large scale condemnation proceedings are currently
employing it. Declarations of taking are sometimes filed after the Act has
been invoked.' 51 There is nothing in the Act which requires the consent of
the court for taking immediate possession; nevertheless, administrative prac-
tice has been to apply to the courts for an order of possession. 152  In view of
the language of the statute and the time of its passage, however, it would seem
that if the need were great and the judge absent or obdurate, possession could
be taken by government under the Act without court action.
The Act has been broadened considerably by the Second War Powers
Act.' 53 Specified agencies and any other agency or governmental corpora-
14754 STAT. 714 (1940), 41 U. S. C. prec. § 1 (1941) as amended by Pub. L. No. 507,
77th Cong., 2d Sess.
148The article could be ordered for export at any time even though initially (at time
of order to manufacture) it was not contemplated that it would be used abroad.
14940 STAT. 241, 518 (1917, 1918), 50 U. S. C. § 171 (1928).
'
5 OThe Act was held not to authorize the taking of personalty used with the land.
Bussey v. United States, 70 Ct. Cls. 104 (1930).
151Settlements and early distribution are promoted by the presence of the deposit under
the declaration of taking and the vesting of the interest desired in the government.152This same practice has been followed in condemnation under the Rivers and Harbors
Act, which permits the taking of immediate possession. 40 STAT. 911 (1918), 33 U. S. C.
§ 594 (1928).
'
53Pub. S. No. 507, tit. II, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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tion designated by the president may acquire realty for war purposes "by
purchase, donation, or other means of transfer," and condemnation proceedings
may be brought under the Act of August 1, 1888, "or other applicable Federal
statute." On filing a condemnation petition immediate possession is obtainable.
The Act is novel in providing that personal property located-on the realty or
used therewith may be taken together with the land, and this in a single con-
demnation proceeding1 534 The Act is not clear as to whether property may
be commandeered by administrative officials without judicial process, but the
phrase "other means of transfer" seems broad enough to include a compulsory
transfer by any means. The Act provides for disposal "of such property or
interest therein by sale, or otherwise, in accordance with section 1 (b) of the
Act of July 2, 1940." Since the provisions referred to do not mention personal
property as such, 154 it requires a liberal construction to find authority in this
statute for disposal of personalty used with the land. -
The amendment is to endure until December 31, 1944, or such earlier time
as the president or Congress may determine.
6. The Requisitioning Act of October 16, 1941.'55-This Act started
off its career in the form of a bill sponsored by the War Department for requi-
sitioning any property, real or personal. In that form it was an admirable
bill. 56 But by the time it had run the Congressional gamut it had become a
model of what a requisitioning act should not contain.'6 7
If the president determines the use of specified articles'58 is needed for the
153*Thus, a fleet of trucks could be taken if used in a plant which was taken over, al-
though at the time of the taking the trucks might not be upon the land.
1S4,. .. plants, buildings, facilities, utilities, appurtenances thereto, and land." 54STAT. 713 (1940). This provision, furthermore, refers to the Secretary of War only.
It is believed, however, that this Act is not limited to disposal by this officer. While
this method of providing for disposal by cross reference is not a happy one, the intent
seems to have been to confer broad powers of disposal. See Hearings before HouseCommittee on the Judiciary on S. 2208, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 18 et seq.
155 Pub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
1661t is set out in Hearings before the S. Cont. on. Military Affairs on S. 1579, 77thCong., 1st Sess. (1941) 1-2. It was based on provisions contained in the War Depart-
ment's famous M plan of 1931. See id. at 6. While it authorized, in terms, only requi-
sitioning, the Act of Aug. 1, 1888, would have operated to permit condemnation proceed-
ings to acquire realty.
15 TThis is partly due to the fact that the apparent occasion for the bill was the bottle-
neck in machine tools; but the War Department, with unrewarded foresight, used this
occasion to have introduced a bill which could be used in all contingencies. Congress still
in a twilight sleep of peace fastened on the machine tool problem and conjured up an
administrative bogie ruining business men indiscriminantly by taking their tools away.
Confronted by this bogie, administrative officials beat an orderly but consistent retreat.See Hearings before S. Cont. on Military Affairs on. S. 1579, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.(1941). For another analysis of this Act, see Note, American Economic Mobilization
(1942) 55 HAxv. L. REv. 427, 511-513.
15SThey are similar to those covered by the Export Control Requisitioning Act,
supra p. 335.
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defense of the United States, he may requisition such property subject to
two conditions:
(a) "Such need is immediate and impending and such as will not admit of
delay or resort to any other source of supply."
(b) "All other means of obtaining the use of such property for the defense
of the United States upon fair and reasonable terms have been exhausted."
The Act expressly disclaims authorization for the requisition of personal
firearms.159 The original Act also excluded machinery or equipment used
in an operating factory or business and necessary for continued operation,
but this last qualification was deleted by an amendment contained in the Sec-
ond War Powers Act.160 The president is authori'zed to dispose of property
thus acquired and can exercise his powers through delegatees.
Where the need for any of the items covered by this A&t is immediate, the
qualifications imposed are utterly impracticable, save only if administrative
officials, as they so often must, ignore these qualifications or apply them in
a formal, meaningless pattern. The language used is so qualified, moreover,
as to imply the possibility that administrative determination may be subject
to judicial review, 161 a review eschewed by the courts where administrative
determination has been challenged under the usual eminent domain statute
empowering an executive official to take property needed for certain pur-
poses. 1 6
2
7. Other Statutory Authority-Besides the War 'Purposes Act 63 dis-
cussed above, there are at least two other statutes under which plants may
be taken,'6 4 and possibly a third.-65 But two of them require disobedience
159Some Congressmen seemed to fear that otherwise the Second Amendment to the
Constitution might be violated. It may be doubted that this amendment was mant to
deny the government the right to require a private citizen to give up his arms for his
nation's defense. A firearm in the hands of a soldier may well be worth two in the
hands of a civilian.16OPub. L. No. 507, Tit. VI, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). This provision was never
favored by the War Department. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Judiciary on S. 2054, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 5. Cf. Note, Britain Mobilizes
Her Industries (Jan. 21, 1942) Bulletins from Britain, p. 4. "Today the Machine Tool
Control may remove machine tools from a factory without appeal and only supplies
machine tools to firms with night shifts."
161These qualifications are altogether foreign to federal eminent domain statutes which
the cases cited in the next footnote deal with. And the courts imply that if decent showing
is made as to bad faith or abuse of discretion they will examine the administrative deter-
mination. Sigore v. Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 28 N. E. 934 (1891) ; see Macfarland v.
Elverson, 32 App. D. C. 81 (1908); Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Shaw, 11 F. (2d)
653 (S. D. Fla. 1926).
162Barnidge v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 8th 1939) ; United States v.
Threlfeld, 72. F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 10th 1934), cert. denied. 293 U. S. 620, 55 Sup. Ct.
215 (1934). Similarly in England, see ScoTT v. HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF REQUISITION
(1920) 94 et seq., 101, 102.16340 STAT. 241, 518 (1917, 1918), 50 U. S. C. § 171 (1928).
164Section 120 of the National Defense Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 213, 214, 50 U. S. C.
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to a compulsory order for materials in order to become operative. Specific
appropriation acts are continually being passed requiring the acquisition of
property; in addition there are many statutes of a general nature which
authorize the taking of property. 66 But in all of them their generality is
limited by specification of the type of property which may be taken or of a
limited purpose for which it may be acquired.
8. Taking of Property by the Executive.--In almost every instance Con-
gress exercises its right to take property by delegation of its power to the
executive branch of the government. Its right to do so is settled.' 67  But
this delegation may be taken away at any time or never made. War needs
in their urgency have not infrequently caused various presidents to take meas-
ures affecting property rights without the sanction of a Congressional enact-
ment. 68 And as long as Congress fails to pass legislation broad enough to
cover the taking of property when an urgent war need therefor arises, it
may be expected that the executives will continue to take property with or
without Congressional action. It is believed that the powers given the presi-
dent by the Constitution furnish sufficient authority for such action on his
part ; 69 and it cannot be asserted dogmatically that if Congress were to ex-
§ 80 (1928) ; Section 9 of the Selective Service Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 892, 50 U. S. C.
§ 309 (Supp. 1941).
165The Naval Appropriation Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 1192, 50 U. S. C. § 82 (1928).
There is some doubt as to whether the pertinent provisions of this Act are still in exist-
ence. This question is treated but not fully discussed in Memorandum with Respect to
the Existing Powers of the Executive Branch of the Government to Arrange for
Priority of Production and Allocation of Orders in Connection with the National De-
fense Program, p. 7., U. S. Lib. of Cong., Legislative Reference Service, Memorandum
to Members of the Advisory Commission Council of National Defense, Series A.
'
60Those existing in the fall of 1940 have been collected and discussed in EXPROPRIA-
TION OF PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, p. 23 et seq. (This is a study prepared in
the Lands Division of the Department of Justice in 1940. It has been made generally
available in most law libraries.) See also Note, American Econiomic Mobilization (1942)
55 HAv. L. REv. 427, 462, 464, 508 et seq. Statutory authority has recently been
granted to take over or close telephone, cable and telegraph systems or units thereof as
well as to remove their equipment. Pub. L. No. 413, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; cf. Public L.
No. 239, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; Pub. L. No. 137, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (community
facilities) ; Pub. L. No. 173, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (vessels for Coast Guard). See
also Exec. Order No. 8974, 6 Fed. Reg. 6441, authorizing the Secretary of War to take
over civil aviation systems. Some of these statutes are temporary but a number are
permanent. By the use of Danger Zone Regulations issued by the War Department
under the Rivers and Harbors Act [28 STAT. 362 (1894), 32 STAT. 374 (1902), 40
STAT. 266 (1917), 33 U. S. C. § 1 (1928) ; see 6 Fed. Reg. 2992], by the establishment
of Defensive Sea and Maritime Control areas (Proclamation No. 2536, 7 Fed. Reg.
301-302; Exec. Order No. 8970, 6 Fed. Reg. 6417), property rights have been seriously
affected. These methods have been used at times as a direct substitute for expropriation.
Cf. also air space reservations. Exec. Order No. 8961, 6 Fed. Reg. 6325; and see Pub.
L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
167Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 43 Sup. Ct. 689 (1923) : Albert
Hanson Lumber Co., Ltd. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442 (1923).
168 See ExPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, c. IV.
1 6 9 ExPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, C. IV. See Note, American
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pressly deny him this power the Constitution would require him to obey.170
9. Co-operation by the States.-Largely for the purpose of aiding the
defense and war program, more than half the states have enacted legislation
making it possible for local bodies to sell, lease, lend or donate property to the
state or federal government,'' and more than a score of states have enacted
defense housing laws.' 72 In some states the Governor has been given power
to expropriate property for war emergency purposes, and, in at least one state,
the powers conferred are broader in some respects than those granted by
Congress to the President.'7 2' Any such powers would, however, be subor-
dinate to the President's powers of expropriation.17 b Where such laws have
been passed without prior consultation with federal authorities, the federal
government occasionally has found it impossible or inadvisable to take advan-
tage of the legislation.
1 73
C. Commentary on the Present State of Authority for Taking Property
In the last world war some twenty statutes were passed expressly authoriz-
ing the compulsory taking of property.'7 4 Varying in language, in purpose,
in specification, their application caused considerable confusion. In this re-
spect no appreciable improvement is evident in the present emergency. In
practically every belligerent country other than the United States, democratic
or totalitarian, the executive branch of the government has been endowed
with broad general powers of expropriation capable of meeting contingencies
as they arise.'15  And these powers have been expressed in terms clear
enough to avoid the necessity of administrative officials going through the
Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 427, 516 et seq. Considerable light
has been thrown on this matter by CORWXN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS (1940) ;
see also LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1940). Cf. United States v. Pink (U. S.
Sup. Ct., No. 42, Feb. 2, 1942) ; Brief submitted by Office of Price Control Administra-
tion, Hearings before H. Com. on Banking and Currency on H. R. 5479, 77th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1941), Pt. 1, 379 et seq. The taking over of strike-bound plants in 1941 has been
thought to be without statutory authority, Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate
Committee on Judiciary on S. 2054, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 10.
17OBut see The Flying Fish, 2 Cranch 170 (U. S. 1804).
17See (1941) 14 State Government 256. E.g., Wyo. Sess. Laws (1941) c. 120
(United States authorized to acquire land by purchase, condemnation or otherwise).
172(1941) 14 State Government 256.17 2
'1.e. Massachusetts, under laws passed in 1941 and 1942. See (1942) 27 Mass.
L. Q. 13 et seq where these statutes are set out.
"72'Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1919);
Opinions of the Justices, 14 Gray 614 (Mass. 1860).173This is true of the action of the New York State Legislature in reviving a statute
enacted during the first world war under which the United States could condemn land
for war purposes. Laws 1941, c. 670. Certain of its provisions are thought to make it
inadvisable to resort to it.
"74 See United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 553, 41 Sup. Ct. 569 (1921).
175See infra part V.
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enervating experience of finding authority in the interstices of language
rather than in the language itself. Congress has been unwilling to give the
executive broad express powers of expropriation, suspicious of the use he
might make of them. Administrative officials have sometimes been inclined
to recommend legislation not on the basis of what is best under the circum-
stances but what has the best chance of passing Congress. And at times a par-
ticular administrative agency will engineer the introduction of an expropria-
tion bill aimed at a minute segment of the broad question of expropriation.
pressure for the passage of which may succeed in obscuring a greater need.'-,
The result is that administrative officials are often forced to locate their justifi-
cation for a particular act of expropriation in a no-man's land of construction
of a statute or chain of statutes which contains no express authorization, or
forced to rely upon their construction of constitutional provisions of amorphous
content. And sometimes they must fly willy-nilly in the face of statute in
reliance upon a subsequent ratification by Congress or the inaction of the
persons concerned. The improvisation which this necessitates is a distinct
handicap to an efficient promotion of the war program.177
The Second War Powers Act' 1 is a distinct improvement over past legfsla-
tion. But it leaves the right to take property by administrative action a mat-
ter of interpretation. There should be an express provision to this effect.
At present there is no statute expressly giving power to take personalty of
all kinds for all war purposes, although it is believed that the emergency
fund statute could furnish plausible authority,179 and possibly the powers of
some of the R.F.C.'s subsidiary corporations are broad enough.179' There
should be a statute phrased broadly enough not to leave the right to take per-
sonalty in the dubious state in which it now is. A single emergency statute
might well be used for this purpose.' 80 Such statute could establish substantive
176The amendment in the War Powers Act to Pub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941) may be such an example.
177Cf. testimony of Mr. Baruch on this point, set out in Hearings before the H. Cont.
on Banking and Currency on. H. R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941) Pt. 2, 22-8 et seq.
'
1 8 Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
179See supra p. 336. The Act of October 10, 1940 and the Act of October 16, 1941
are limited in their authorization, but they do not limit authorization which may be
found elsewhere.
'
7 9
'The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, when requested by the Federal Loan
Administrator, with the approval of the President, is authorized to create corporations
which, among other powers, may "take such other action as the President and Federal
Loan Administrator may deem necessary to expedite the national defense program."
Pub. L. No. 108, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. The charters of the Defense Plant Corporation
and the Metals Reserve Corporation contain such powers.180At the time of the armistice in the last world war a general commandeering statute
was being considered. See Hearings before S. Cont. on Military Affairs on S. 1579,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13. Mr. Ginsburg: "I do not know of any statutory powe~r
to commandeer or requisition for all aspects of the national defense program." Hearh.os
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and procedural standards or leave such matters to published regulation by the
president. With the background of experience and study on these matters
which the present administration""' and Congress possess, 8 2 the drafting prob-
lem does not loom large. Either in such statute or in a separate statute, power
should be given to dispose of property similar to that provided for during the
last war. 8 3 It would be well to provide by statute that government officials
or specified members of the public have the right to go upon and use property
for air raid precautionary and protective purposes, 8 3' and a federal statute
would be helpful to make clear the right to go upon property prior to a taking
for preliminary surveys and tests, a right often expressed in state condemna-
tion statutes.
III. METHODS oF TAKING
A. Agencies
Since the time when defense activities on the part of the Government be-
came earnestly pressed, several agencies new and old, have been authorized by
the president to exercise requisitioning powers ;184 in some instances authority
has been given to one agency to recommend requisition to another agency.185
This authority has been not infrequently taken from one agency and trans-
fered to another.
before House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Pt. 2 (1941) 1545.
'
81This is especially true of the Department of Justice, the War Department and the
Department of the Navy.
'
82Between the last war and this war, Congress has had many bills before it for the
expropriation of property-both for war purposes and for peacetime purposes. See, e.g.
H. R. Res. 198, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); War Policies Commission Report, H.
Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) Serial No. 9538; and many other hearings and
reports. The War Department's mobilization plans are well known by Congress. The
early ones contained carefully drawn proposed statutes for expropriation of both personal
and real property.
18340 STAT. 548 (1918). But it should probably be broadened to include leasing and
other methods of disposal. Some of the current authorizing acts contain disposal pro-
visions; some do not. 40 U. S. C. § 204a provides to a limited extent for the disposal
of surplus property. Cf. 38 Ops Att'y Gen. 466 (1936) (does not supersede provisions
of Merchant Marine Act of 1920, authorizing disposal of houses acquired in war time).
Cf. Pub. L. No. 400, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (housing). As to the Second War
Powers Act, see supra, p. 336. In the first world war there was some question as to the
right of the U. S. Shipping Board to sell government vessels seized. This doubt was
finally settled by legislation. See 4th Annual Report, U. S. Shipping Board (1920) 31.
s3'Cf. Ch. 13 of Minn. Laws, 1942, Dec. 6, see infra Pt. V.
'
8 4E.g., Exec. Order No. 8964, 6 Fed. Reg. 6367-6368 (radio stations and facilities).
The Defense Communications Board is to designate stations for use of or closing by other
government agencies. See Note, American Economic Mobilisation (1942) 55 HARv. L.
REv. 427, 455, note 172.8 5E.g., Exec. Order No. 8734, 6 Fed. Reg. 1917.
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Each requisitioning agency has its own internal procedure. In December
1941, regulations were issued under the Acts of October 10, 1940,186 and
October 16, 1941,187 pursuant to a prior executive order.188  Under these
regulations 89 the Office of Production Management was given not only direct
requisitioning powers but requisitioning by other agencies under these Acts
were subject to the approval of that office. At present, the War Production
Board is vested with the powers formerly in the Office of Production Manage-
ment. 90 Within the War Production Board an Inventory and Requisition-
ing Section in the Division of Industry Operations has been set up which
handles requisitioning questions for the Board.
With the War Production Board as an over-all authority on requistioning
under these two acts, it is unlikely that requistioning by other agencies of
the government will be allowed to upset the hair-trigger war time economy
established by priority, allocation and price control. But how well this check-
up system will work where the need of some item or items cannot brook delay
remains to be tested.' 91 Probably some informal arrangement between the
agencies concerned will take care of situations in which consultation becomes
a too expensive luxury rather than a proper inodus vivendi.
At present the War Shipping Administration has the purchasing and requi-
sitioning powers the United States Maritime Commission possessed under
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 as amended. 192  Agencies authorized to
purchase or procure land may do so by way of condemnation. 193 Foreign
exchange control has been centralized in the Department of the Treasury. 9 4
18654 STAT. 1090 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 99 note (1942). Initially the determination
of the necessity of requisitioning under this Act was made by the Secretaries of War
and Navy, acting through the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, in co-operation
with the Administrator of Export Control. See Exec. Order No. 8567, 5 Fed. Reg.
4123. Regulations were published shortly after the passage of the Act. See 5 Fed. Reg.
4123.
18TPub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
188Exec. Order No. 8942, 6 Fed. Reg. 5909.
1896 Fed. Reg. 6376.
19OSee Exec. Order No. 9024, 7 Fed. Reg. 329; Exec. Order No. 9040, 7 Fed. Reg. 527;
Regulation No. 2 of the War Production Board, 7 Fed. Reg. 561.
191Taking a machine tool from a going concern may be very necessary, but in the
very nature of things the need is not a matter of minutes or hours. The need for requi-
sitioning a single civilian aeroplane may be such a need.
192 Exec. Order No. 9054, 7 Fed. Reg. 837-839; cf. Note, American Economic Mobili-
zation (1942) 55 HAgv. L. Ray. 455.
193Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442 (1923).
See supra p. 336.
19 4 See Exec. Order No. 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897, which set out detailed regulations and
provided for the reporting of all foreign-owned property; the "foreign countries" in-
cluded Sweden and Switzerland but not England. See 7 Fed. Reg. 145 as to Japanese
property.
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B. Methods and Procedure95
Most property acquired by the government is secured through negotiations
and contract. 196 When expropriation is resorted to, it may take one of several
forms. Possession of the property may be taken without more-a fait accom-
pli.197 This method is not often resorted to, outside the area of actual combat.
Within that area it is common. 198
Condemnation of realty in wartime still proceeds much as it did in peace-
time. The agency desiring certain realty requests the Attorney General to
institute condemnation proceedings. Thereafter the Lands Division of the
Department of Justice has general supervision over the condemnation pro-
ceedings.
A method frequently used in the last world war, and not uncommon in the
present one, to expropriate property is through the issuance of an executive
order or proclamation. This has the advantage of permitting one order or
proclamation to cover future contingencies, by delegating to some responsible
officer the discretion of determining when expropriation shall be had and of
what. When speed of acquisition is vital, this is an important point. The
order of proclamation of course may be used for a single specified expropria-
tion. It has the further advantage of avoiding judicial delays since the tak-
ing proceeds without application to the courts. Furthermore, it permits reli-
ance upon constitutional powers when Congressional authorization is lacking.
So far as is known, federal condemnation petitions have always invoked statu-
tory authority, although it may well be that the proceeding could be main-
tained on executive authority alone.
Nevertheless, a taking by condemnation may often be preferable. 199 In the
first place an expropriation of property by condemnation proceeding is a
normal method used in peace time as well as war time. It has a background of
administrative practice which the other methods do not have and that practice
is concentrated, largely, in one agency, the Department of Justice. It is a
judicial proceeding and both private persons and the government have the bene-
fit of the "day in court." By the use of declarations of taking and orders of
possession, property may be acquired almost as rapidly as by executive order
or proclamation-sometimes more quickly.2 1°  A condemnation proceeding
may bring in hundreds of claimants, most of whom settle their cases by sti'pu-
39 5The effect of procedural requirements upon the measure of compensation will be
discussed infra, Part VI. See infra Pt. IV as to control over enemy alien property.
19 6See Note, American Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 527, as to
the procedure and the problems involved in such acquisitions.197E.g., Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 52 Sup. Ct. 267 (1932).19SBut military commanders may use requisition orders if time and circumstances
allow.
199See Note, Awrican Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HARV. L. REV. 427, 509.2
°°Skeleton petitions facilitate initiation of condemnation proceedings.
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lation, and legal issues are decided in one case, thus avoiding the possibility
of a hundredfold rehashing of such issues.
Condemnation proceedings, however, are geared only for a single project.
Every time an acquiring agency decides to get a piece of property by con-
demnation, all necessary steps to maintain the action have to be repeated.
Moreover, a recalcitrant or ignorant judge may play hob with war needs,
while a bombed-out court or unavailable judge i's not a far-fetched possibility.
It is believed, therefore, that there is a place for all these types of taking. 0'
Requisitioning regulations which have thus far been published emphasize
the procedure to be followed by a claimant to secure compensation after the
requisition has taken place, but contain little as to the mechanics of requisition-
ing. In the absence of published complaint it may be assumed that admin-
istrative officials have used reasonable requisitioning methods. Nevertheless,
since the men actually issuing such requisitioning orders or carrying them out
may often be unaware of the practical and legal consequences of their
actions,20 1  it would seem advisable to publish general regulations to act as a
guide for such matters, as well as rules concerning essential material to be
embodied in any requisition order, the type and time of notice to be given, if
any,201- b etc. In case of expropriation of personalty, an admonition to secure an
inventory as soon as possible, with or without the owner's co-operation, would
be advisable.2 02
Condemnation statutes usually designate the specific agency which may use
the statute. Requisition statutes commonly specify the President as the requi-
sitioning authority. If well drafted the latter type of statute will authorize the
power to be exercised through such agents as the President may wish to use.
For the most part, executive orders and proclamations have been used to
201It might well be provided by statute that the government could or should bring
condemnation proceedings to determine compensation where an administrative taking
has been consummated.20 The Pietro Campanella, 41 F. Supp. 656 (D. Md 1941) where the court required
the Maritime Commission to clarify its notice of taking.2lbMethods of giving requisition notice have varied considerably: (1) telegram; see
Olympia Shipping Corp. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cis. 251 (1930); (2) marshal; see
W.P.B. press release No. 751, March 31, 1942. In a situation involving the requisition-
ing of property of French citizens under the Export Control Act, the Export Control
Administrator asked the Attorney General's advice in respect to giving notice to owners
who could not be contacted. The Vichy government was claiming rights under its laws.
The Attorney General advised that notice by publication in the United States would
suffice, but notice should be given to the French government also. As to the contents
and form of a notice given by the United States Maritime Commission, see The Villar-
perosa, 43 F. Supp. 140 (E. D. N. Y. 1942). In the Villarperosa case the Maritime
Commission adopted a resolution Oct. 31, 1941, which recited that the vessel was taken
over as of Oct. 31, 1941, at 12 o'clock; the notice of taking was dated Oct. 30, 1941.
The court, in a passing remark, said that the requisition was made on October 30, 1941.
Cf. 2 Ops J. Ad. Gen. 233 (1918) where in reference to a tax question it was said that
title passed upon service of the requisition order.202Such regulations should probably provide that they be followed whenever possible,
but that failure to observe them would not invalidate the taking.
I
1942]
346 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
requisition property. But even where the statute refers only to the President,
the impracticability of requiring him to make individual determinations as to
each exercise of requisitioning power makes it apparent that such power,
within reasonable limits,2 0 3 is delegable,20 4 and in this and in the last world war
it has been delegated to a considerable extent.20 5
203Cf. 33 Ops Att'y Gen. 570 (1923).
2 04 United States v. McIntosh, 2 F. Supp. 245, 252 (E. D. Va. 1932) ; app. dismissed
70 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 1934) ; cert. denied, 293 U. S. 586, 55 Sup. Ct. 101 (1934).20 5Cf. Ex Parte Whiting Steamboat Corp., 249 U. S. 115, 39 Sup. Ct. 192 (1919).
